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Abstract
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has be-
come a touchstone model for modern privacy law, in
part because it empowers consumers with unprecedented
control over the use of their personal information. How-
ever, this same power may be susceptible to abuse by
malicious attackers. In this paper, we consider how le-
gal ambiguity surrounding the “Right of Access” process
may be abused by social engineers. This hypothesis is
tested through an adversarial case study of more than 150
businesses. We find that many organizations fail to em-
ploy adequate safeguards against Right of Access abuse
and thus risk exposing sensitive information to unautho-
rized third parties. This information varied in sensitivity
from simple public records to Social Security Numbers
and account passwords. These findings suggest a crit-
ical need to improve the implementation of the subject
access request process. To this end, we propose possible
remediations which may be appropriate for further con-
sideration by government, industry and individuals.
1 Introduction
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) repre-
sented a sea change in the way European residents could
control, restrict, and understand the use of their personal
information. As arguably the most consequential attempt
to regulate data security to date, GDPR’s ambition has
caused millions of organizations to reflect on and even
revise their cyber-security and data collection practices.
One particularly notable feature of GDPR is the power
it gives to individual consumers to act as the first line
of defense against data abuse. Under GDPR, European
residents have the right to request, review, amend, and
delete, personal information which organizations store
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about them.
In this paper, we consider the practical implementa-
tion of this right, with a particular focus on mechanisms
to prevent its abuse to steal sensitive information about
a third party. We find that GDPR itself provides little
guidance on best practices and, more broadly, that little
attention has been paid to the possibility of request abuse
for the purpose of data theft. This lacuna is contextu-
alized through a real-world experiments in which sim-
ulated fraudulent GDPR requests are sent to more than
150 organizations.
Our experimental findings demonstrate that many or-
ganizations fail to adequately verify the originating iden-
tity of right of access requests. The result is that social
engineers can abuse right of access requests as a scalable
attack vector for acquiring deeply sensitive information
about individuals. We suggest several mitigations which
may help remediate this situation, both in the status-quo
context of GDPR and in the context of emerging next-
generation privacy laws.
2 Background and Motivation
GDPR came into effect on May 25, 2018, as an ambi-
tious replacement to decades-old European privacy leg-
islation. The law outlines new requirements for orga-
nizations handling personal data, including serious fines
for non-conformance. The largest offences could incur
fines of up to 20 million or 4% of a company’s annual
revenue - whichever is greater (Ch. 8, Art. 83) [1].
Companies in violation of the law have already begun to
feel these consequences. For example, Google has been
fined 50 million by the French Commission nationale de
l’informatique et des liberts (CNIL) for its handling of
personal data for advertisements [2]. Additionally, Mar-
riott International and British Airways have been fined
over 99 million and 183 million, respectively, by the UK
Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) for breaches
resulting in the compromise of customer data [3, 4].
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However, some surveys suggest that many small busi-
ness owners are still uncertain that they are fully compli-
ant with the law [5].
A fundamental component of GDPR is the “right of
access” to one’s personal data (Ch. 3, Sec. 2). To exer-
cise this right, residents of the European Union are per-
mitted to send subject access requests (SARs) to almost
any organization. The recipient of the SAR is then per-
mitted one month to respond, ideally with a copy of all
the personal data the organization holds on the sender.
According to the text of the GPDR, an organisation is
permitted to employ “all reasonable measures to verify
the identity of a data subject who requests access” (Rec.
64). As more specific details are not readily available,
organizations may be inclined to interpret this require-
ment on a case-by-case basis. Further, the law specifies
that organizations are not permitted to collect data for the
sole purpose of verifying identities in response to future
SARs (Rec. 64). This severely restricts the spectrum of
viable identity validation measures - especially for data-
brokers and other organizations without direct consumer
interaction.
An organization not otherwise exempt from GDPR re-
quirements is only permitted to refuse to comply with
an SAR for one of two reasons (Ch. 3, Art. 12). The
first refusal condition is met if an SAR is deemed “ex-
cessive” in frequency. This applies to individuals who
send the same or similar SARs within a very short pe-
riod of time. The second refusal condition is met if an
SAR is deemed “manifestly unfounded.” The UK ICO
lists six example reasons why this condition may apply
to an SAR under their “Guide to the GDPR” [6]. These
reasons include using GDPR requests as a component of
blackmail, to harass or disrupt and organization, to tar-
get particular employees, or to waste organizational re-
sources. No direct association is made between the term
“manifestly unfounded” and the threat of fraud. More-
over, the burden of proof appears to fall to the organi-
zation, with the UK ICO stating that organizations “are
responsible for demonstrating that [the request] is mani-
festly unfounded” [6].
These reasons relate to malicious intent on the part of
the sender but do not discuss the possibility of fraud di-
rectly - focusing instead on the abuse of GDPR requests
to waste organizational resources.
An organization refusing to comply with an SAR for
one of the reasons above is still required to respond to
the sender with the reason for refusal [6]. According to
the UK ICO, the response should also remind the sender
of their rights to complain to regulation authorities or to
seek legal action against the refusing organisation. It it
therefore fairly risky to fail to provide data in response
to an SAR, even for a valid purpose. For an organiza-
tion concerned about receiving large fines or damaging
their reputation, it may be less dangerous to comply with
potentially invalid requests than to risk challenging legit-
imate ones.
Calculations such as the above may leave organiza-
tions vulnerable to social engineering attacks which tar-
get the SAR process. Often, skilled social engineers will
attempt to create an artificial sense of urgency or fear
to pressure victims into divulging sensitive information.
However, under GDPR both time pressure and the threat
of fines already exist as a natural effect of the regulation.
Additionally, as the GDPR provides a clear mechanism
for gaining access to sensitive data, there is no need for
an attacker to invent a sophisticated pretense for the ini-
tial request for information beyond a simple reference to
GDPR rights. In short, the right of access process ap-
pears intuitively well-suited to abuse by social engineers
and ambiguity surrounding both identity verification and
request denial grounds in GDPR further bolsters this pos-
sibility.
3 Experimental Design
The objective of our experiment was to determine if an
unsophisticated attacker might acquire sensitive personal
information about an individual through malicious sub-
ject access requests. Casey Knerr, the second author
of this paper, consented to play the role of “victim” in
the experiment. Subject access requests to more than
150 organizations were submitted in her name without
her direct participation or interaction. When organiza-
tions requested additional information to complete these
requests, only a small subset of publicly-available data
was considered available to the attacker. The ultimate
responses of organizations, and any personal data which
they provided, was recorded and analyzed to present a
broad overview of GDPR right of access practices.
This experiment was devised as a cursory assessment
of the status quo. Having only a single target, and one
known to the attacker, likely introduced some biases in
the findings. While efforts were made to reduce these ex-
perimental biases (see Section 3.1), future research with
several diverse and anonymous victims would represent
a methodological improvement over this initial investi-
gation.
3.1 Threat Model
Our threat model sought to replicate the capabilities of
a highly constrained attacker. Generally, the constraints
on our attacker can be grouped into two broad categories:
knowledge constraints and operational constraints.
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Table 1: OSINT Attacker Knowledge
Starting Information Possible Source
Full Name LinkedIn
Free Emails
Guessing
(e.g. first.last@gmail.com)
Professional Emails Company Website
Phone Numbers Personal Website
3.1.1 Knowledge Constraints
The knowledge constraints imposed on our attacker re-
volved around the information about the victim which
the attacker was permitted to incorporate into their social
engineering attacks. Specifically, our attacker was as-
sumed to know nothing other than basic public informa-
tion about the target derived from informed guesswork
and open-source intelligence (OSINT). This information
is summarized in Table 1. The OSINT restriction en-
sured that our simulated attacker represented the weak-
est possible form of the attack. Further research on the
capabilities of more targeted or informed attackers (e.g.
an attacker who has stolen someone’s wallet) may prove
valuable.
As the attack progressed, the attacker was permitted
to use any information they found about the victim to
supplement this OSINT knowledge base. So, for exam-
ple, if a targeted organization provided the attacker with
a home address for the victim, the attacker was allowed
to include that home address in future requests.
3.1.2 Operational Constraints
The operational constraints on the attacker revolved
around the actions which the attacker could take in man-
aging requests. Again, we sought to replicate a weak
form of the attack, leaving open opportunities for re-
search on more capable attackers. Specifically, the at-
tacker was considered incapable of doing anything other
than sending emails and falsifying simple documents
(e.g. postmarked envelopes). Other capabilities, such
as the ability to forge signatures and identity documents,
or the ability to spoof email headers, were not assessed
in this experiment.
Additionally, due to legal concerns, no falsified doc-
uments were created for the experiment, but instead le-
gitimate documents were submitted in such a way as to
replicate the capabilities of the attacker (e.g. a genuine
bank statement with all account information covered up).
We would expect future work which replicates a more
sophisticated attacker - either via technical means (such
as email account hijacking or spoofing) or via physical
means (such as passport forgery) - would likely have sub-
stantially higher success rates than this baseline threat
model.
3.2 Implementation and Delivery
One of the principle goals of the attack was to develop a
mechanism for social engineering at scale. By targeting a
large number of organizations, even if only a minority of
them prove vulnerable, that proportion may be sufficient
for the attacker’s purposes. As such, a generic and de-
liberately vague GDPR subject access request letter was
devised which would apply to almost any imaginable or-
ganizations but would still appear legitimate. This letter
was then templatized and sent to more than 150 organi-
zations using a simple python mailer script.
3.2.1 SAR Design Considerations
In this section, we will point out a few aspects of the
letter which were designed with the explicit goal of in-
creasing the likelihood of attack success. The full text of
the subject access request letter appears in Appendix A.
One of the principle benefits of targeting GDPR pro-
cesses for social engineers is the severe time pressures
which the law imposes on organizations to issue a re-
sponse. Given that an organization typically has only one
calendar month to respond to any given GDPR request
(with limited extensions of up to one additional month),
broad or complicated GDPR requests can be difficult to
respond to within the allotted timeframe. Under these
pressure dynamics, we hypothesized that organizations
may be tempted to take shortcuts or be distracted by the
scope and complexity of a request and pay less attention
to the identity verification aspects of the law.
As such, the letter is deliberately vague with regards
to the requested data, asking for “any personally identifi-
able information that [the] organization (or a third party
organization on [the organization’s] behalf) stores.” To
further compound this complexity, the letter requests not
only digital account information, but also data located
in “physical files, backups, emails, voice recordings, or
other media.” This vagueness permits the letter to apply
in a wide range of circumstances without organization-
specific tailoring.
Additional complexity is cultivated through two re-
quests for information that are not directly relevant to the
attacker’s objectives. First, the letter requests informa-
tion about any data-sharing relationship with third parties
- requiring an organization to not only identify informa-
tion they hold about the data-subject but also the origin of
that data. A response containing this information has the
added benefit of identifying additional targets for future
attacks against the victim.
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Second, the letter requests information regarding if
personal data has ”been disclosed inadvertently [...] as
a result of a security or privacy breach.” This query is
something of a red-herring and is added to suggest a
plausible purpose for the subject access request. The in-
tention is to cause a receiving organization to suspect that
the attacker has some knowledge of a disclosed or undis-
closed data breach and is using the GDPR request to es-
tablish grounds for a lawsuit or regulatory complaint. We
hypothesized that such a belief might cause organizations
to overlook identity verification abnormalities.
Beyond adding complexity, the letter also attempts to
preempt one of the principle causes of attack failure - a
request for proof of identity. The letter does this by offer
to provide identity documents which are “proportional”
to the data subject’s existing relationship with an organi-
zation. This interpretation of GDPR is mildly supported
by the law itself, which states that data controllers “shoud
not retain personal data for the sole purpose of being able
to react to potential requests” and that data controllers
should use “all reasonable measures to verify the iden-
tity of a data subject” (Rec. 64)[1]. Proportionality is
an ambiguous standard which may be difficult to deter-
mine in the case of many organizations which have no
direct relationship with a consumer (such as advertising
data-brokers). This gives the attacker justification later
on to credibly refuse to provide certain forms of identity
documents.
To further bolster this preemption, the letter also spec-
ifies that the attacker is only willing to provide identity
documents through a “secure, online portal.” This un-
willingness to provide proof of identity via e-mail can
be further supported through referencing guidance on the
UK information commissioner’s website suggesting that
e-mail is a risky means of transferring personal data [7].
This demand leaves an organization with three sub-
optimal choices. First, they can provide the secure, on-
line portal as requested. However, if such a portal does
not exist - as is often the case for small and mid-size
businesses - they only have a single calendar month to
acquire such a capability. Second, they can refuse to
provide a portal and insist that documents be sent over e-
mail. This means that they are potentially denying funda-
mental rights to a data-subject unless the data-subject is
willing to take an unnecessary risk with their data. In the
event of a subsequent breach of the organization’s mail
servers, this behavior may be regarded unfavorably by
regulators. Finally, the organization can elect not to re-
quest identity documents at all, or to request weak forms
of identity a user is comfortable sending via email. In
our case, this is an ideal outcome for the attacker.
3.2.2 Delivery and Targeting
The subject access request letter was designed as
a modular .pdf template in which both the vic-
tim’s details and the target organization’s name
could be dynamically altered. A fake email ac-
count impersonating the victim, of the format:
[first name][middle initial][last name]@gmail.com
was created to send the malicious letters. A simple
python script was used to deliver the attack to 150
organizations in two waves of 75 organizations each.
Letters in the second wave were bolstered with addi-
tional information about the victim that was acquired in
the first wave.
No particularly rigorous methodology was employed
to select organizations for this preliminary study. We at-
tempted to replicate an attacker who had no prior knowl-
edge of the victim and, as such, selected a handful of
well-known organizations within various sectors (e.g.
travel or retail). Upon completion of the experiment, we
determined that slightly more than half of the queried
organizations actually held personal data on the target.
Our findings are likely heavily biased towards organiza-
tions which do business in the United States and United
Kingdom - the two countries with which the authors are
most familiar. More rigorous future research, especially
research which considers regional and linguistic varia-
tion, is likely warranted. However, even this crude initial
approach was sufficient to provide weak quantitative in-
sights into the nature of various organizational responses
to malicious subject access requests.
3.3 Ethical and Legal Concerns
The experiment was designed around a number of ethical
and legal constraints. The only subject of the experiment
is also a co-author on this paper and, while she was not
permitted to participate directly in order to limit bias in
the experimental findings, she was kept informed and re-
affirmed her consent at all stages of the experiment. Prior
to publication of both this paper and the corresponding
presentation at Black Hat USA 2019, all screenshots and
extracts from responses were redacted to remove sensi-
tive information. These redactions were reviewed and
accepted by the experiment’s subject.
In engaging with corporations, GDPR requests were
submitted with the data subjects’ genuine interest in re-
viewing the personal information which they may store
about her. When organizations asked for forms of iden-
tification, such as passports or driver’s licenses, no at-
tempt to falsify these documents was made - although
we suspected that few organizations had the internal ca-
pacity to verify the legitimacy of such documents. Sim-
ilarly, when phone interviews or sworn statements were
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required, although these are readily falsified, no attempt
to do so was attempted. In a small number of situations
where a weak form of identity verification was requested
(such as a postmarked envelope), legitimate copies of
these documents were provided with the data subject’s
informed consent to assess what the ultimate impact of
their forgery might have been.
With regards to vulnerability disclosure, we have di-
rectly contacted and informed some organizations with
the most severe findings. Unlike software vulnerabilities,
the disclosure of social engineering vulnerabilities may
have undesirable secondary effects, such as scapegoat-
ing the individual who “fell” for the attack even when
their doing so was a result of poor organizational pol-
icy. As the focus of our research was on the broad sys-
temic impact of privacy laws, rather than an attempt to
“catch-out” any specific company, we made a case-by-
case judgement on the appropriateness of disclosure vis-
a-vis the severity of our findings. On account of these
considerations and to maintain focus on the broader ob-
jective of this research, we have elected not to name any
specific organizations which were vulnerable to the at-
tacks.
4 Case Study Results
Our survey of around 150 organizations revealed signifi-
cant diversity in the implementation of the subject access
request process and, more specifically, within identifica-
tion standards applied to that process. While we found
that many organizations implemented reasonable secu-
rity controls, we also found many either implemented
insecure identity verification controls or no controls at
all. Beyond these immediately relevant findings, the case
study also revealed many other details which may be
useful to researchers, legislators, and organizations in-
terested in the real-world manifestations of GDPR com-
pliance.
4.1 Initial Responses
Not all of the organizations contacted had GDPR subject
access request processes in place (see Figure 1). Approx-
imately one quarter of organizations contacted never re-
sponded to the request. It is unknown if this is because
they somehow determined it was illegitimate or if they
simply did not have a process in place to respond to sub-
ject access requests submitted under GDPR. Within this
quarter, a small number of companies responded by say-
ing that they believed GDPR did not apply to them due
to jurisdictional constraints. This response came not just
from small businesses but also four large (Fortune 250)
companies doing business primarily in the United States.
These organizations contended that, even though the data
Figure 1: The initial responses of organizations who re-
ceived a malicious subject access request.
subject was a European resident, she had no rights to re-
view the data they held about her under GDPR due to
their nature as American businesses.
Of those organizations which did respond to GDPR
requests, approximately two thirds responded in such a
way as to reveal whether or not the victim had used their
services. While the severity of account enumeration can
vary depending on the specific circumstance, in some
cases the mere existence of an account can reveal deeply
sensitive information about an individual, such as in the
case of the Ashely Madison data breach in 2015 [8]. In
our experimental findings, online dating services were
among those organizations which enumerated the pres-
ence of user accounts in response to GDPR requests.
4.2 Ultimate Responses
Within the subset of organizations which had informa-
tion about our simulated victim, around a quarter pro-
vided sensitive information without verifying the iden-
tity of the requester (Figure 3). A further 15% of orga-
nizations contacted requested a form of identity that we
believed could easily be stolen or forged (such as a de-
vice identifier or a signed statement swearing to be the
data subject) but which we did not attempt to falsify (see
Section 3.1.2). A small number of organizations (5%)
claimed not to have personal information about the data
subject even though she did have an account controlled
by the organization. Finally, a handful of organizations
(3%) misinterpreted the subject access request letter as
a data removal request and deleted the data subject’s ac-
count without requiring any further identity verification.
On a more positive note, around 40% of organizations
requested a form of identification which was beyond the
reach of our threat model. We observed significant vari-
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Figure 2: The types of identity requested by organizations.
ability in the form of identity requested, which suggests
that there is no clear “best-practice” (Figure 2). The most
common form of identity verification, and one which met
the proportionality test proposed in section 3.1, was to
require an email from the original email account used to
register with the organization or a login to the data sub-
ject’s account.
Not all organizations had access to either of these
forms of identity (such as in the case of data-brokers or
physical retailers). In these instances, government-issued
identity documents, while disproportionate, were the fa-
vored mechanism for identity verification. Some organi-
zations used somewhat novel forms of knowledge-based
identity verification, perhaps motivated by the propor-
tionality test suggested in the malicious subject access
request letter, such as knowledge of the last retail loca-
tion the data-subject visited or information about the ac-
count creation date. This sort of information was beyond
the scope of our threat model, but a closer investigation
into to feasibility and security of such knowledge-based
proofs of identity may prove worthwhile.
With regards to industry-specific tendencies, our sam-
ple set was not large enough to make conclusive obser-
vations. However, our findings suggest that industries
which regularly handle sensitive information (e.g. air-
lines or banks) or which frequently receive GDPR re-
quests (e.g. social media organizations or consumer-tech
giants) tended to be less vulnerable to this specific attack.
Meanwhile, organizations in more esoteric sectors (such
as education or entertainment) with less experience han-
Figure 3: The ultimate responses of organizations who
received a malicious subject access request.
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dling sensitive identity documents or processing GDPR
requests tended to be more likely to reveal sensitive in-
formation. We found that the largest organizations in our
data set (e.g. Fortune 100 companies) tended to perform
well and that the smallest organizations tended to simply
ignore GDPR requests. Non-profits and mid-size orga-
nizations (100 - 1,000 employees) accounted for around
70% of mishandled requests. This may suggest that there
is a “social-engineering sweet-spot” targeting organiza-
tions large enough to be aware of and concerned about
GDPR, but also small enough to not have dedicated sig-
nificant resources towards compliance. A broader survey
capable of robustly validating these initial trends is likely
merited.
4.3 Extended Engagements
In a handful of instances where an organization requested
a strong form of identity verification, we found that these
requirements were flexible in practice. For example, af-
ter telling a large online gaming company (more than
$1bn in annual revenues), that we had forgotten our ac-
count password and could not log in to verify our iden-
tity, the organization simply provided the data they held
without any further verification.
Figure 4: A screenshot of a response which agreed to
take a postmarked envelop in lieu of a passport photo-
copy as proof of identity.
In other instances, it was not possible to completely
eliminate the identity verification process but it was pos-
sible to substantially weaken it. For example, a major
rail services operator in the United Kingdom initially re-
quested a passport photocopy as proof of identity but,
after some negotiation, agreed to accept a postmarked
envelope instead (Figure 4. Similarly, several organiza-
tions - including a cybersecurity services company - ac-
cepted a heavily redacted photograph of a bank statement
which contained no banking information beyond the vic-
tim’s name and address. This suggests that, even when
identity documents are requested, little effort is made to
verify their authenticity.
4.4 Data Findings
In total, over 60 distinct instances of personal informa-
tion were acquired in the experiment. We defined an
“instance” as previously unknown personal information
of a particular type (e.g. phone numbers) from a given
provider. So, for example, if a provider responded with
a single previously unknown phone number and a list of
15 previously unknown IP addresses, that would be con-
stitute two “instances” of personal information leakage
in our analysis.
To better understand these findings, we classified each
instance in terms of low, medium, or high severity. These
classifications were necessarily arbitrary but were made
according to our expectation regarding the exploitability
of the information in question.
Low severity instances (approx. 25%) consisted of
data which did not have obvious direct applications
to further attacks against the victim. This included
advertising profiles and public records assembled by
background-checking agencies. A small portion of ac-
count enumeration vulnerabilities relating to sensitive
accounts (e.g. online dating profiles) were also included
in this category. This data was not intuitively useful in
our threat model but may, in certain instances, provide
an attacker with insight to help them target further attacks
against their target or engage in other social engineering
operations (such as blackmail).
Medium sensitivity instances (approx. 60%) consisted
of data which might be of plausible utility to an attacker
but only in certain circumstances or with significant addi-
tional effort. This included information like standardized
test scores, phone numbers, and historical location and
purchasing data. Some of this information (e.g. previ-
ous residential addresses) could be used to bolster subse-
quent GDPR requests with additional identifiers. Other
information (e.g. detailed purchase histories) might be
used to impersonate a credit card provider or bank as a
component of a phishing operation. Finally, some of the
information provided a deep insight into personal activ-
ities and behaviors - such as a complete record of rail
journeys taken by the data subject over the past several
years or a complete record of hotel stays with a major
UK hotel chain.
High sensitivity instances (approx. 15%) consisted of
data which was of obvious utility to an adversary. For
example, a major education services organization pro-
vided the data subject’s full US Social Security Num-
ber without requesting any identity verification prior to
doing so. Based on information on the organization’s
website, we expect that the records of more than 10 mil-
lion individuals may have been susceptible to this attack.
Similarly, several organizations provided partial infor-
mation about the victim’s credit card numbers. By the
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Figure 5: A redacted response from a threat intelli-
gence firm which provided passwords and password
hashes from previous (since removed) pastebin creden-
tial dumps. The data subject had never heard of or di-
rectly engaged with this organization.
end of the attack, 10 digits of the victim’s card number,
the card’s expiration date, originating bank, and postcode
were all known to the attacker. While this may not have
been sufficient to make actual purchases, it may have
been sufficient to impersonate the target’s bank in so-
cial engineering operations - especially when combined
with the medium sensitivity purchase histories discussed
previously. In one particularly novel instance, a threat
intelligence firm provided the attacker with previously
breached usernames and passwords belonging to the data
subject (Figure 5). These passwords were subsequently
tested and found working on at least ten online accounts,
including an online banking service.
These findings demonstrate the potential severity of
mishandling right of access requests. Unlike other social
engineering typologies, such attacks provide readily jus-
tified and complete access to an individual’s entire data
profile with an organization. Moreover, many of the or-
ganizations that hold data about a target may be organi-
zations whom the target has never heard of or interacted
with directly (such as the aforementioned threat intelli-
gence firm). In such instances, it is nearly impossible for
the target to know that their data is stored insecurely or
to know that their information may have been compro-
mised.
5 Proposed Remediations
There is clear need to address these vulnerabilities. To
an extent, this research is a first step in so far as it raises
awareness of this attack vector and encourages busi-
nesses to think critically about their subject access re-
quest process. However, there are also tangible changes
which legislators, businesses, and individuals might con-
sider to improve the status quo. We suggest a handful of
the most intuitive here but future work considering the
optimal approach to identity verification for right of ac-
cess requests is likely merited.
5.1 Legislators and Regulators
Legislators and regulators are well-suited to attempt to
remediate these issues. With minor modifications to
GDPR, much needed clarity on reasonable forms of iden-
tity verification for data rights requests could be pro-
vided. Even without modification to existing legisla-
tion, information commissioners could provide tangible
guidance to organizations regarding appropriate forms of
identification might be for a given right of access request.
Such guidance could also be incorporated into future pri-
vacy laws modeled on GDPR.
Perhaps even more importantly, legislators can
weaken many of the factors which encourage businesses
to improperly implement identity verification. Simply
assuring businesses that rejecting a suspicious right of
access request in good faith will not later result in pros-
ecution if it turns out that the request originated from a
legitimate but suspiciously-behaving data subject may be
all that’s needed for many of the organizations implicated
in this study.
In the longer term, legislators may consider offer-
ing government-mediated identity verification services
for data subjects. Existing services, such at the UK’s
“Gov.UK Verify” service may be scaled up to provide
simple yes/no answers on proof of identity to businesses
seeking to validate an individual [9]. Then, instead of
sending sensitive passport documents to a retailer, for
example, a consumer could send them to a trusted gov-
ernment service. This would allow for individual data
subjects to reap the benefits of strong identity valida-
tion without sharing sensitive data with an untrusted third
party in order to do so.
5.2 Businesses
Absent changes to legislation or improved regulatory
clarity, businesses can still attempt to better protect them-
selves and their customers from this class of attack.
About 40% of businesses included in the case study
took an approach which was beyond the capabilities of
our low-level threat model. For most organizations, this
was simply a matter of requiring subject access requests
to originate from an email previously known to belong
to the data subject or requiring a data subject to log in
to their online accounts. If these two identity modes are
unavailable, requesting government-issued photo ID is
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likely the most robust way to prevent this attack. How-
ever, organizations who are incapable of adequately pro-
tecting this data, or verifying its authenticity, should con-
sider outsourcing these services to a third party.
Businesses should also regularly assess their subject
access request process for vulnerabilities and train indi-
vidual service representatives on detecting and respond-
ing to such attacks. Incorporating malicious subject ac-
cess requests, like the one used in this paper, as a compo-
nent of regular penetration tests may help mitigate these
issues before they become a potential data breach.
5.3 Consumers
Individual consumers have little influence over how orga-
nizations elect to share their data in response to subject
access requests. However, there are some basic actions
which may prove useful in mitigating the harms of these
attacks.
First, individuals may benefit from considering their
data footprint and which organizations may hold sensi-
tive information about them. In cases where this data
relationship is not needed (e.g. a service which the indi-
vidual no longer uses), submitting data removal requests
may be prudent to limit the potential avenues for infor-
mation leakage. In cases where data deletion is not an
option, individuals may benefit from enquiring with a
given business as to if any past right of access requests
have been filed in their name and what the ultimate result
of those requests was. This may allow an individual to
identify and react to data leakage if it has taken place.
Moreover, individuals should be wary of “knowledge-
based” authentication as proof that a call or email origi-
nates from a given business. For example, in our experi-
ments it was possible to obtain a list of dozens of recent
purchases made by an individual and many digits of their
credit card number. An attacker could use this informa-
tion to impersonate a bank representative and potentially
do further harm to their victim. As such, even knowledge
of extremely granular and esoteric data should be treated
with suspicion when used as proof of identity.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have hypothesized that the GDPR right
of access request may be a point of vulnerability to social
engineering attacks. Through an experiment encompass-
ing 150 organizations, we demonstrated the real-world
viability of such attacks. We find that a large propor-
tion of organizations inadequately verify the originating
identity behind right of access requests and that, as a re-
sult, deeply sensitive information can be acquired in a
repeatable and scalable manner by social engineers. We
suggest a number of remediations with a focus on indi-
viduals, businesses and lawmakers, to help mitigate these
attacks.
This paper represents a preliminary and cursory inves-
tigation of how privacy laws might be abused by attack-
ers in novel and unanticipated ways. A great deal of fu-
ture work - both to verify these initial findings and to
characterize other related vulnerabilities - is needed to
understand the mechanism by which such vulnerabilities
arise in privacy laws and how they may best be antici-
pated and avoided. The aspiration of all privacy legisla-
tion is to ensure a safer and more honest internet. Align-
ing the implementation of these regulations with their
ambition is a vital prerequisite to doing so.
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Appendix A: Malicious Subject Access Request Letter 
[TARGET'S ADDRESS] 
[ATTACKER’S EMAIL] 
Dear Sir or Madam, 
Subject Access Request 
I hope all is well. I am writing to initiate a subject access request under my rights as a European resident 
and a resident of the United Kingdom. Please supply the information about me I am entitled to under the 
Data Protection Act 1998 (UK) and the General Data Protection Regulation 2018 (EU) as a data subject 
and user of [COMPANY NAME] services in a commonly used and machine readable format. 
In particular, please supply any personally identifiable information that your organization (or a third party 
organization on your behalf) stores about me. Please include data that your organization holds about me 
in your digital or physical files, backups, emails, voice recordings or other media you may store. 
If you are additionally collecting personal data about me from any source other than me, please provide 
me with information about these sources, as referred to in Article 14 of the GDPR. 
Finally, I would like to request information regarding if my personal data has been disclosed 
inadvertently by your company in the past, or as a result of a security or privacy breach. 
In addition to my name, this email address, and the postal address indicated above, my accounts may be 
affiliated with the following identifiers: 
- Name: [TARGET FULL NAME] 
- Email: [ATTACKER’S EMAIL] 
- Email: [FIRSTNAME.LASTNAME@gmail.com] 
- Email: [OTHER TARGET EMAILS (e.g. from company website, data breach pastes)] 
- Phone: [TARGET PHONE(S)] 
 
If you need any more information from me, or a reasonable fee, please let me know as soon as possible. 
If you require identity documents to complete these requests, provided that the sensitivity of these 
documents is proportional to the data I have already consented to allow your organization to store, I am 
willing to provide these documents via a secure, online portal as soon as possible. 
It may be helpful for you to know that a request for information under the GDPR should be responded 
to within 1 month. 
If you do not normally deal with these requests, please pass this letter to your Data Protection Officer. If 
you need advice on dealing with this request, the Information Commissioner Office can assist you and 
can be contacted on 0303 123 1113 or at ico.org.uk 
Yours faithfully, 
-[TARGET NAME] 
